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A "Gold Standard" Isn't Viable
Unless Supported by Sufficiently Flexible Monetary and Fiscal Policy

ABSTRACT

The paper studies an idealized gold standard in a two-country
setting. Without flexible national domestic credit expansion (dee>
policies which offset the effect of money demand shocks on international
gold reserves, the gold standard collapses with certainty in finite time
through a speculative selling attack against one of the currencies.
Various policies for postponing a collapse are considered.
When a responsive dee policy eliminates the danger of a run on a
country's reserves, the exogenous shocks disturbing the system which
previously were reflected in reserve flows, now show up in the behaviour
of the public debt. Unless the primary (non-interest) government
deficit is permitted to respond to these shocks, the public debt is
likely to rise (or fall} to unsustainable levels.
For the idealized gold standard analysed in the paper, viability
can be achieved only through the active and flexible use of monetary and
fiscal policy.

Willem H. Buiter
Economics Department
Yale University
New Haven, Connecticut 06520

Note: I would like to thank Peter Phillips and Paul Milgrom for helping me
find my way through continuous time stochastic processes and Kenneth Kletzer
for helping me with Section 4.

1.

Introduction
This paper is a theoretical study of the viability of a fixed

exchange rate regime which for brevity I refer to as a gold standard.
In a two-country world the monetary authority of each country guarantees
the convertibility of its non-interest bearing fiat currency into gold
at a fixed price.

There is an exogenously given global stock of gold,

which has no non-monetary uses.

I therefore abstract from one feature

of the historical gold standard, under which the international reserve
asset had uses as a private consumption good and as an industrial
intermediate good and raw material, and could itself be produced through
an extractive production process.

The essence of "gold'' in this model

is that it is an "outside" non-interest bearing fiduciary asset whose
aggregate quantity is exogenous to each private and public agent in the
global economic system and

1

to the system as a whole.

By viability of the gold standard I mean its probability of
survival and the expected duration of its survival.

Special attention

is paid to the way in which particular monetary, financial and fiscal
policy actions, or rules, affect the viability of the system.
The paper extends to a two-country setting the single country
analyses of a collapsing managed exchange rate regime by Krugman [1979],
Flood and Garber [1983, 1984a, bJ, Obstfeld [1984a, b, cl and others.

1

For a more descriptively realistic analysis of certain aspects of the
historical Gold Standard see e.g. Barro (1979], Eichengreen [1984,
1985a,bl, Barsky and Summers (1985], Borda and Schwartz (1984].
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These papers in turn were macroeconomic applications of the seminal
paper by Salant and Henderson (1978] on collapsing commodity stockpiling
schemes.

My approach owes a lot to the work of Grilli (1986] who

analysed buying and selling attacks on the same currency in a small
country model.

I use his idea of specifying two shadow floating

exchange rates, one governing a buying attack and one governing a
selling attack, although for the formal analysis in this paper I reduce
these two to a single shadow floating exchange rate between two
absorbing barriers.

Flood and Garber (1983] use a log-linear continuous

time stochastic two-country model to analyse a different class of
problems (stochastic process switches> which could be formalized in
terms of the behaviour of a stochastic process and a single absorbing
barrier.
Section 2 outlines the model.

Section 3 develops the

characterization of the "shadow floating exchange rate'' as a Wiener
process, with or without drift, between two absorbing barriers.

As long

as the shadow floating exchange rate stays between the barriers (in the
viable or safe range) the gold standard survives.

When the shadow rate

reaches either barrier, the gold standard collapses through a
speculative selling attack on one of the two currencies.
Section 4 looks at the various ways in which policy actions can
affect the shadow floating exchange rate process and thus the viability
of the gold standard.

It considers in detail those policy actions that,

(leaving unchanged the nature of the shadow floating exchange rate
process as a Wiener process with drift between two absorbing barriers
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and leaving unchanged the variance of that process), alter the width of
the viable range, the drift paramer (the instantaneous mean of the
process) and the initial value of the shadow rate.

Section 5 considers

feedback policies that turn the (non-stationary) Wiener process into a
stationary stochastic process.

Section 6 looks at policies that can

alter directly the variance parameter of the original Wiener process.

2.

The Model
The two country model to be analysed is a linearized version of the

model given in equations (1) to (10).
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Because the model includes accounting identities as well as relative
price levels, there is no convenient log-linear specification.
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The two countries are assumed to have identical demand for money
functions (equations I l l and 1211.

This permits us to analyse exchange

rate behaviour without having to specify a goods market equilibrium

condition.

Starred variables refer to foreign country variables.

i is

the nominal interest rate, y real output, M the nominal money stock, P
the price level, 8 the stock of government bonds, R the stock of foreign
exchange reserves,

~

the primary <i.e. non-interest) government deficit

and S the spot exchange rate (the domestic currency price of foreign
currency>.

We assume i, 1·* > 0.

Interest is not paid on reserves, a

realistic assumption under a gold standard, when the domestic and
foreign currency prices of gold are fixed.
There is a single traded good.

(3) is the law of one price.

Financial markets are efficient and there are risk-neutral speculators,
so uncovered interest parity <UIPJ holds, as given in 141.Et is the
expectation operator conditional on information available at time t.
The total stock of gold in the world economy is exogenously given.
Consumption and production of gold are therefore ignored.
Each country maintains convertibility of its currency into gold as
long as its stock of reserves exceeds an exogenously given critical
minimum value <RMIN
country>.

*
for the home country, RMIN
for the foreign

If either country's stock of reserves falls to its lower

threshold, the fixed exchange rate regime collapses and a free float of
indefinite duration begins.

Equation (10) states that there are enough
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global reserves to satisfy the two countries' minimal requirements
simultaneously.

3

Linearizing the model and evaluating it at the fixed exchange rate
S which, without loss of generality, can be set equal to unity, we
obtain the following first order differential equation for the floating
,

exc h ange rate:

11)

4

= o:

5

S(tld(t> - °M[M(t) - M* (t)Jdt + Z(t)dt

where

lla> o:

s

= -

(e-.-l 1 PJ
~J

>o
0

3

Most of the analysis is concerned only with differences between the
values of country-specific variables such as domestic credit expansion,
money demand growth etc. It may be helpful to think of country-specific
or global variables (real output, the world price level under a fixed
exchange rate) as not having any long-run trend. This makes the
standard convention in this literature of specifying reserve floors or
ceilings in nominal terms (rather than in real terms or relative to some
nominal scale variable such as nominal income, trade or financial
wealth) less objectionable. The analytically most convenient way of
specifying the world commodity market equilibrium condition required to
solve for individual countries' price levels and nominal interest rates,
is to postulate a fixed ex-ante real interest rate.
4

For algebraic convenience we also assume that M =SM.
*
0

0

0
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[;! t >,
-1

l lb>

°M

= -

0

llc> Z<t> =

When a speculative selling attack against the home country's
currency occurs and the fixed exchange rate regime collapses at t = T,
the money stocks fort~ Tare given by:

(12a) M<t> = D<t> + RMIN

(12b) M* (t) = D* (t) + R - RMIN

Dando* are the home and foreign stocks of domestic credit
respectively, i.e. dD = [~ + iB] dt - dB
When a speculative selling attack against the foreign country's
currency occurs and the fixed exchange rate regime collapses at t = T,
the money stocks fort~ Tare given by:

*
(13a) M<t> = D<t> + R - RMIN

*
<13b) M* <t> = D* <t> + RMIN
Following Grilli [1986], equation (14a) describes the evolution of
S, the shadow floating exchange rate that would prevail fort >

T

if the
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fixed exchange rate regime collapses at t = r as the result of a
speculative selling attack against the home country's currency.
Equation (14b) governs S, the shadow floating exchange rate that would
prevail fort

~

r if the fixed exchange rate collapses at t = r as the

result of a speculative selling attack against the foreign currency.

% S(t)dt - °M (D(tl-D * <tl - R
% S<t>dt - °M (D(t)-0 * (t}

+

+

2RM!Nldt + Z(t}dt

*
R - 2RMINldt
+ Z<t>dt

An important simplifying assumption is that D<t> and o*<t> (and
indeed Z(t}) are unaffected by the occurrence and timing of a collapse
of either currency.
Choosing convergent forward-looking solutions for Sand S we find

~

(15a) S<t> =

co

Je

%(t - u}
EtC°M<D<ul

-

D* (u} - R

2 RMINl

- Z(u)Jdu

*
R - 2 RMIN}

- Z(u)Jdu

+

t
co

<15b > S(tl = Je
t

%(t - u}

EtC°M<D<ul - D* (ul

+

The fixed exchange rate regime collapses through a speculative
selling attack on the home currency when the home currency shadow
floating exchange rate equals the fixed rate for the first time, i.e.

8

when

::.:

( 16a > S ( t

>

= S;

s ( t' ) < §., t' < t

It collapses as the result of a speculative selling attack on the
foreign currency when the foreign currency shadow floating exchange rate
equals the fixed rate for the first time, i.e. when

( 16b ) S ( t

>

= S;

S<t'> > S, t' < t

The fixed exchange rate regime survives as long as

~

(17)

S <Sand S > S
Note from (15a, bl that

::.:

(18a) S<t> = S<t> + K

where

From the assumption of minimal g1obal reserve adequacy (eqn(l01) it
follows that K > 0 and therefore that

9

(18c> S<t> > S(tl

We therefore rewrite condition <17) for viability of the fixed
exchange rate system as:

S < S < S + K

Without loss of generality we can choose the lower bound to equal
zero.

5

Formally, the exercise we are performing can therefore be seen

as the analysis of a continuous time stochastic process S between two
absorbing barriers; the lower barrier O and the upper barrier K > 0.

<19)

0

<S <K

This is illustrated in Figure 1.

s0 <t) represents a realization which

is absorbed at the upper barrier at t .
0

s 1 <tl

is absorbed at the lower

barrier at t •
1
Except in Section 5 we assume that dD, dD * and dZ are each governed
by mutually serially independent Brownian motion with drift t, i.e.

5

We can always replace expressions such as prob<§< S < S + Kl with

the equivalent prob(O < S - §<Kl, if we also change the initial
condition of the stochastic process involved in an appropriate manner.

s

K

s0
0
I
I
I

I
I
I

I
I

I

I
I
I

I

0

t,

to

Figure

1

t
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(20a) D(t) = 0(0) + µt + w(t)

Given an initial condition, D, D* and Z will ther~fore be
continuous functions of time.
respectively.

dw<t>

The drift coefficients areµ,µ * and

They can be positive, zero or negative.

~ NIID<O,

2
a dt)

NIID<O, a* 2 dt)

dw*<t>

~

dw (t}
2

~ NIID<O,

2
a dt)
2

6

Define:

* dZ are not assumed to be
The independent increments dw, dw,
contemporaneously independent.

6

1-'z

11

( 21>

F(t> = °M<D<t> - D* <t> + R

F(t} is a Wiener process.

(22al

~

7

Its drift is

=

Its variance parameter is

2
(22b > aF =

Its initial value is

<22c l F(O>

From (15al and the definition of F<t> in (21} it follows that

7

where

and
Cov(dwF(t), dwF(s)) = 0, t

~

s
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(23)

S<t> =

F<t>

%

+

~

2

%

~

Therefore, S<t> is a Wiener process.

(24a)

Ps

=

= -~ (µ - µ * ) -

%

Its drift is

~

%

Its variance parameter is

(24b) o

2
5

Its initial value is

- *
'11(0(0>-D * (0)+R-2RMIN>
( 24c > S ( 0 >

%

The expected value of the shadow floating exchange rate is
therefore driven up by the excess of the home country trend rate of
domestic credit expansion, µ, over the foreign trend rate of domestic
credit expansionµ* and by the excess of the foreign trend rate of
change of money demand over the home country trend rate of change of
money demand,-~.
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3.

The Gold Standard as a Wiener Process With Two Absorbing Barriers.
From the characterizatio n of Sas a Wiener process between two

absorbing barriers, a number of propositions follow immediately.
Proposition 1.

Under the conditions specified in Section 2, the

gold standard collapses in finite time <with probability 1).
Proof.
f~

A Wiener process, with or without drift (i.e. with

§ 0), between two absorbing barriers is absorbed with probability 1

in finite time.

See e.g. J.M. Harrison [1985, p. 43].

Note that the variance of the shadow floating exchange rate
increases without bound as t increases.

Any gold standard with a finite

global stock of gold reserves will be non-viable, in the sense that a
speculative attack will exhaust one country's reserves with probability
one in finite time.
It is important to note that, at a point in time, the 'fundamental'
shocks to domestic credit and money demand are infinitesimal, i.e. of
measure zero compared to the stock of reserves at that instant.

It

always takes a finite amount of time to achieve a finite change in the
stock of reserves through the cumulative effect of these shocks.

The

finite, stock-shift rundown in a country's stock of reserves at the
moment a speculative attack occurs, reflects the endogenous behaviour of
speculators, not the occurrence of an exogenous shock that is large
relative to the existing stock of reserves.
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An implication of this specification of the exogenous shocks is
that neither currency will ever be at a forward discount or premium, as
long as the gold standard survives.

At the instant a speculative attack

brings down the gold standard, a forward discount or premium consistent
with UIP may of course emerge.

Let r be the time at which the gold standard collapses, either
Let S(Ol = s

because S reaches K > 0 or because it reaches O.
be the initial value of Sat t = 0 and let
variance parameter of S.

1-'s

0

E[O, K]

and a~ be the drift and

p<S , S; t) is the conditional probability
0

that Sis at Sat time t > 0 given that it starts at s0 at time t = 0,
when there are two absorbing barriers, at K > 0 and at 0, and with
0

< s0 < K.

Then (see Cox and Miller (1965, p. 219-234])

-JI. t

C25al pCS , S; ti
0

a e
n

n

. (n77S~
sin

l7<J
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where

and

2 2 2
n rr a5 }

<25cl A

n

K2

G(tl, the probability that Sis absorbed no later than time t (i.e. prob
(T

<

t) ) is given by

K

(26)

G(t) = l -

J

p(So' S; t) ds

0

K

Note that g(t)

= G'(tl

= -~t

J

p<S ,
0

s;

tldS is the probability density

0

function of

T.

The moment generating function of Tis
co

g * ( V)

-vt
g (t

>

dt

for v 2: 0.

The moments of r (such as the first moment E0 <rll are found by
differentiating g * (v) w.r.t. v, since

16

(27)

2

For the Wiener process with drift~' variance parameter oS, upper
absorbing barrier Kand lower absorbing barrier O < K, starting at

(28a) g * (v)

where

From (27) and (28a, b) we derive the expected duration of the
interval until the collapse given in (29, a, b).

8

8

(29a) is derived from (29b) by applying L'Hospital's rule twice.

s0 ,

17

Finally (see e.g. Cox and Miller (1965, p. 233]), the probability of
absorption at the upper barrier (i.e. the probability of the gold
standard collapsing through a speculative selling attack on the home
country currency) rr+<S 0 > is given by

s
<30a> rr+<S 0 > = Ko if~= o

=

The probability of absorption at the lower barrier rr_<S 0 >, is then of
course given by

4.

Monetary, Financial and Fiscal Policy Actions and the Viability
of the Gold Standard.
No attention is paid in this paper to strategic behaviour by the

monetary and fiscal authorities of the two countries.

It is probably

easiest to think of the various policy actions a5 being implemented by

18

mutual agreement or co-operatively; formally, we simply vary policy
parameters in an exogenously given manner without worrying about
conjectured and actual responses of other policy makers, time
consistency of the actions or rules etc.

Consideration of those very

important issues is beyond the scope of this paper.

We distinguish 5 different kinds of policy actions.
a>

Policies that change the initial value or starting value of the

shadow floating exchange rate process at t = 0, s .
0
b>

Policies that change the drift of the shadow floating exchange rate

process,~c>

Policies that change the width of the "safe

d>

Policies that change the S process from a Wiener process with drift

or viable band'', K.

J-1=; and variance parameter a~ to a stationary first order linear

stochastic process whose "forcing variable" 1s a Wiener process without
drift, i.e. to

(31}

dS = °sSdt + dw
°s
dw

e>

5

<0

5 ~ NI ID

2

<O, a dt

5

>

Policies that change the variance parameter of the S process, a 2 •
5

It will become clear that any given policy action or rule change
may bring about several of these five consequences at the same time.
A number of results are immediately established.
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011+(50)
(32a)

aso

orr+ (5 >

0

(32b >

aso

1 .f
= Kl

~

= 0

2
2
<2~105 > exp<-2~50 105 >
=
>Oif~;,t.O
2
1 - exp<-2~K/o >
5

Clearly, policies that raise s increase the probability of the collapse
0
of the gold standard occurring through a selling attack on the home
currency.

<Oif~-;,!-0

Clearly, policies that widen the viable band by raising the upper
limit reduce the probability of the collapse of the gold standard
occurring through a selling attack on the home currency.
Note from the definition of Kin (18b> that an increase in K means
an increase in the global stock of reserves and/or a reduction in the
countries' critical reserve thresholds. Since the experiment holds s
0
constant (and

*
.LJs>, the increase in R or reduction in RMIN or RMIN'
must
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be accompanied by a reduction in 0(0} or an increase in D* (0) (see 24c).
Such a combination of events obviously makes it more likely that the
collapse, when it occurs, will occur through a run on the foreign
currency.

The increase in world reserves is allocated to the home

country.
The effects of an increse in os2 and of an increase in fis on rr* cs
are given in (32c, d} below

<32c >

011+ <S >
0

2
005

011+ (so)

( 32c'}

2

005

(32d)

where

arr+< s0 >
a~

=0

if~

2fis

=0

= --A ~
<o~}2

-2

= 2A

as

>

0

0 according as to~§ 0 if fis

~0

0

>
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-5 (1
(32e)A =

0

A< 0.
2

The effect of policies that raise s , K, o and
0
5

.LJs on the expected

duration of the period for which the gold standard survives are given in
equations (33 a, b, c, dl.

aE ( Tl
0

<33al

<33a'

(33b)

9

K - 2S

=

aso

l

0

2

if

as

aE ( Tl
0

aso
aE ( Tl
0
aK

2

exp ( -2~SQ/ OS l

1

= - - + ~K
2
2
[ 1 - exp(-2~Kl_o lJ
~
05
5

so
= y>
as

0

(

> 0 for .LJs > 0.

Let

Q

~ -;t!.

-s0 <I

o.

2
2
- exp<-2.LJsKlo >l + K<1-exp (-2.LJsSo/ Os l l
5

denote the numerator of A in (32c).

-c-s0 <1
Q

if

if~ = 0

From (29a), E <Tl > 0 =>
0

Therefore

.LJs = 0

< 0 and A< 0.

Then

2
2
- exp<2.LJsK/oSl) + K<l - exp<2.LJsS 10 llJ.
0 5
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>Oif.Lis';r!O

aEO(T)
( 33c >

=

2
00 S

<33c' >

-E <T>
0

aE ( T)
0

= ~A

2

(o~> 2

005

aE <r>
0
a/-ls

(33d)

<33d'

l

< 0

2

if /-ls

=0

OS

=0

aE <rl
0

if /-ls

<Oif/-ls-;cO

=0

-1 [E0<rl
~

=

0/-ls

<H

Equation (33a) shows that when there is zero drift raising the
starting value

l

s0

.

will raise (lower) E (Tl if
0

s0

is below (above) the

halfway mark of the survival range, i.e. for s <
0

K

2

<S

0

K
>2
>.

I f ~ ~ 0, (33a') tells us that the effect on E <r> of an increase in
0
is positive for
defined by

O

~

s0

aEO(r) = 0

aso
interpreted as

<

s0

, negative for

s0

<

s0 < K

where

.The first term on the RHS of (33a'l can be

s0

s0
is

23

the effect on E <r> in the absence of any uncertainty
0

10

The second

•

term on the RHS of (33a'> always has the opposite sign of the first
term.

s0 , regardless of the sign of /Js·

It decreases with

When I-ls= 0, widening the width of the viable range by raising its
upper limit, K, obviously lengthens the expected survival period, (33bl.
The same holds when~~ 0 (33b').

11

That a higher value of the variance parameter reduces the expected
duration of the gold standard's survival is not surprising (33 c, c').

s0

K -

10

u_

In that case r is non-stochastic and given by r =

if

11

For the case

~

~

0, first consider I-ls > 0.

2

2

-x

> O.

X -m
.
-< < l +m- >

integer and x < m then e
X

=

0

<

<0

We know that if x

2~L

o£0( T)
d<

crs

X

X

-)
S (1 - m

-m

•

x < 1, we find ex(l - x>

the case~< 0 and 1 +
obvious.

~

Applying this with m =land x = - - - we find
2

For the case~< 0 we know that if x

~

O, mis any positive

Applying this with m =land

<

0

The sign of (33b' l is

always the sign of l - exp(-21JsKlcr > Cl+ <2!JsKlcr >J.
5
5
~ 0 and mis any positive interger, then
e

>

if I-ls

·~

1 and again

0, the result that

aE < rl
0

aE <r>
0

at<

at<

>0

> 0.
is

For
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A higher value of the drift parameter
effect on E <r>.
0

E <r> if
0

/-Is

/-Is

appears to have an ambiguous

Without uncertainty, an increase in

is negative, lower E <r> if
0

/-Is

/-Is

is ~ositive.

will raise
With

uncertainty, the two terms in the square brackets on the RHS of (33d)
<£0(

have opposite signs and more information is needed to sign

T)

011s

We now consider alternative policy actions at t = 0, that maximize
the expectation of the survival period of the gold standard.

Policies that Increase K.
From (18b> it is apparent that, given the values of the parameters
~m and

°s'

the viable range of Scan be increased only by an increase in

the exogenous global stock of reserves Rora lowering of the critical
reserve thresholds R . and R* . •
min
min

From (24c) we note that an increase

in Rora reduction in R* . 12 will raise s by half as much as K.
min
0

5(0)

1
is kept constant when R is increased and D<O> - D* (0) [or -/-Is]
is

%

reduced by half the amount of the increase in R.

If the lower bound of

the viable range were L < K rather than zero, we could represent a
"symmetric" increase in the viable range by an equal increase in the
upper bound Kand reduction in the lower bound L.
leave

12

s0

unchanged for given values of D,

o*

It was assumed, in (24c) that R. = R* min
min

and

Such a policy would

/Js·
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In our model, an increase in K accompanied by an increase in s0

of

half the magnitude of the rise in K can be achieved either by equal
reductions in R. and R* . or by an increase in R that is distributed
min
min
equally between the two countries.

An increase in K with constant s

0

and constant~ requires an increase in D* (0} and/or reduction in 0(0).
Take the example of an increase in D* (0) which neutralizes the effect of
an increase in Ron

s0 •

stock-shift increase in

Barring helicopter manoeuvres, such a

o*

can only be brought about through an open

market purchase of bonds by the foreign government, since

C~*

+

* dt - dB *
i * BJ

As a smaller stock of foreign government bonds is now outstanding,
government debt service will be less as a result of the open market
purchase than it would otherwise have been (by i 0*dB * approximately>.
Unless the government now continues (flow} purchases of its debt or
increases its primary deficit~* by the amount of the reduction in debt
service, its expected rate of domestic credit expansionµ *dt will be
lowered, resulting in increases in

s0 and~-

bond purchases (or sales> are not feasible.
constant

Indefinite government
An increase in K with

s0 and Ps' therefore, represents a combination of an increase

in world reserves (or reductions in reserve thresholds>, an open market
sale by the home country government (or an open market purchase by the

foreign government} and a reduction in the home government's primary
deficit (or an increase in the foreign government's primary deficit).
(See Suiter (1976] for a discussion of these issues in a small country
setting).
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We can summarize the main findings of the discussion of increases
in K as follows.

Proposition·2.

A larger global stock of gold reserves raises the

length of the expected survival period of the gold standard.

Collapse

in finite time remains a certainty, however, with any finite stock of
reserves,

Policies That Change

s0 _

I now consider policies that change s
K, 1

15

or

2
os·

0

without causing changes in

It is easily seen from (24cl,_ (18b) and <24a) and <24b)

that such policies are redictributions of the given global stock of
gold.

An increase in 0(0) - 0 * (0) redistributes reserves from the home

country to the foreign country and raises s •
0

Such stock-shift changes

in 0(0) or O* (0) are brought about by open market sales or purchases.
To prevent changes in~ from resulting from such open market sales or
purchases, fundamental fiscal corrections, i.e. changes in the primary
deficit must be brought out, as discussed in the preceding subsection.
Given K,

~

and

as2 there exists a unique value of s , "s
0
0

a unique value of O<O> - 0 * <O>> that maximizes E <r).

0

from (33a') •

13

This is obtained

13

The second order conditions ate satisfied.

For~

(and therefore

For~> 0 and~< 0
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"

(34)

so

= .!_ K if ~ = 0
2
2
exp ( -2~50/ O's>
A

l
(34' l - §_2 K
~
as

(1

·2
- exp(-2~K!o >J
5

if~

?f.

0

The problem with such redistributions of world reserves is that
even when they raise E (rl (something both fOUntries can agree onl, the
0
probability of the collapse of the gold standard, when it occurs,
occurring through a speculative selling attack on currency X always
increases (decreases) when country X gives up (acquires) reserves
through the open market sales and purchases outlined above.

If there is

any opprobrium attached to succombing to a speculative selling attack,
countries that have excessive reserves (from the point of view of the
survival of the gold standard) may yet be loath to give them up.

This

leads to Proposition 3.

Proposition 3.

There exists an E (rl maximizing initial
0

distribution of reserves defined by (34, 34'), (24c) and

*

R<O> = D<O> - 0(01 + R
2

14

Since any reserve redistribution increases

14

With identical money demand functions, identical initial income
levels, a fixed exchange rate~= 1 and UIP, it follows that M<O> =

M*<o>.

Since M = D +Rand M* = D* + R - R, Proposition 3 follows.
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the likelihood of the collapse of the gold standard, when it occurs,
occurring through a selling attack on the currency of the country that
has given up reserves, co-operative redistributions of reserves may be

difficult to achieve without a mechanism for compensating the loser.

Policies that Change

f:s·

From (24a) it is apparent that an increase in the difference
between the expected rates of change of the home country's and the
foreign country's stocks of domestic credit, increases

* which raises J-1s would, however, also raise
inµ - µ,

J-ls·
s0

An increase

(see (24c)),

which is an increasing function of the "present discounted value" of all
future expected dee differentials.

*
To raise J-1s without also rai.sing s0 • the increase inµ - µ must be
accompanied by a reduction in D(O) - D* (0), i.e.

*l
1
(35) d(D-0 * l = --d(µ-µ
%

Note that an open market sale by the home government (say) which is
not accompanied by a reduction in the primary deficit and is not
followed by further borrowing, lowers D but, through the increased debt
service requirements, raisesµ by dµ

~

-i dO.
0

A once-off open market

sale by the home government therefore raises~ and will raise (lower)

It does not appear to be correct that J-1s =
E <Tl for given values of
0

s0

<and Kand a~).

0 always maximizes
E.g. with a value of

s0
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very close to the lower end of the viable range, 0, a positive value of
~

I conjecture, but have not been able to

might well raise E <r>.
0

prove, that when both~ and s0 are the subject of policy choice,
15
however, E <r) is maximized when~= 0 and s0 = }K.
0
Note that this requires

15
= 0 if~

if
if

~

-;,=

~

-;,=

aE <r)
0

o.

= 0 if

0~

~

=

aE (r)
0

o;

0~

2
1
= -.:......( E ( Tl + ( 2KA/ "s) J
.Lis

0

Therefore, at an interior extremum, if .Lis

0.

2
= -<2K/.Liscrs>

~

a·
~

I have been unable to sign

-;,=
~

a'
~

o,
Also,

= 0 if~= 0 and

=

1

2~

1

=~do satisfy the first order
0
conditions for an interior extremum.
unambiguously.

.Lis = 0 and s
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and

*
+ 2 R MIN

To achieve these combined targets for the initial stocks of
domestic credit D101 - D* (0) and for subsequent ~rend or expected dee's

* will in general require using both once-off open market
µ - µ,

*
purchases or sales and a choice of (relative) primary deficits~ - ~.
Therefore:

The E <r> maximizing selection of
0

Proposition 4.

I-ls

and s can be
0

achieved only by using both monetary and fiscal policy instruments.
Note that only if

I-ls=

reserve exhaustion problems.

2
oS = 0 will the gold standard not run into

"In that case the value of s0 is immaterial

as long as it is in the interior of the viable range.

5.

Policies That Achieve a Stationary Shadow Exchange Rate Process
Thus far the stochastic process governing the forcing variables D,

o*

and Z (given in 20a, b, cl and the stochastic process governing the

shadow floating exchange rate S (given in (23)) have been Wiener

processes with drift.

Such processes are non-stationary.

with a constant variance parameter o~ and drift
w <t> where dw (t)
5
5

~ NIID<O,

o2 dtl.
5

.ug,

Specifically,

S(tl = 5(0) +/.1st+
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The variance of S(t) therefore increases linearly with t and Sis
nonstationary even if~= 0.
We maintain the assumption that Z(t) is governed by the Wiener
process with drift given in (20cl, but permit the policy instruments to
be governed by linear feedback rules that relate dee to the state
variable S.

For simplicity we assume that the feedback rules are exact

or non-stochastic, i.e. that the only sources of noise in the system are
the money demands in the two countries, Z(t).
managed in such a way that F(tl

= °M(D(tl-D * (t)

D(t) and D* (t) can be

-

+ R

governed by

<36) dF( t)

where dwF

~ NIID<O, a 22dtl.

The first·order representation of the shadow exchange rate equation
(l4bl and the feedback rule (36) is given

16

in <37)

Note that in general, dF(t) = o:m d (D <t > - D* ( t >l - dZ <t > =

*

.

o:md<D<t> - D <t>> - .t-1zdt-dw 2 .
d<D - o*> =

°!='
0:

m

S<t>dt

+

.uz

0:

m

The non-stochastic linear feedback rule

dt achieves (36), where wF = -w .
2
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l
(37)

S<t>dt

=

dF(t}

0

F(t}dt

The characteristic equation of this dynamic system has one unstable
root <p
2

> 0) and one stable root (p1 < 0) i.f.f.

~

> 0.

Assuming this

condition to be satisfied, the solution for the non-predetermined
variable Sand the predetermined variable F(t) can be found to be (see
e.g. Suiter (1984]),

Therefore

(39) dS<t> = °sS(tldt +dw

5

with

17

The second term one might expect on the R.H.S. of (38),
co

-E t

J

e

t

'°2(t -

T)

dwF( r}dr = 0 because wF

is white noise.
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and

It is therefore rather straightforward <technically) to design dee
feedback rules that turn the original non-stationary shadow exchange
rate process into the stationary process given in (39).

The fact that

(39) is stationary does not, however, resolve the problem of
non-viability of the gold standard.

Proposition 5.
The gold standard whose shadow exchange rate is governed by the
stationary process in (39) will collapse in finite time with probability

Proof:

The first order linear stochastic differential equation

whose forcing variable is a Wiener process is known as the
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck <O.U.) process.

In Cox and Miller [1965, p. 2334] it

is shown that the stationary O.U. process is recurrent, i.e. any state
is reached from any other state in finite time with probability 1.
Hence given any initi~l state

s0 ,

0

< s0 < K,

reached in finite time with probability one.

the barriers will be
This proposition can be

extended to higher order stationary linear stochastic processes with
constant coefficients.
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6.

Flexible dee Rules and the Viability of a Gold Standard
From equation (15b) it is apparent that there exist policies for D

and o* that ensure that the shadow floating exchange rate will never
break through its upper or lower barrier.

Policies that fix Sat any

value between O and K preclude a speculative run on either currency.
achieve this, both the drift

To

1--'s (given in (24a) and the variance

parameter o~ (given in (24b)) must be set equal to zero.

To set the

drift equal to zero does not .require any special technical ability of
the policy makers.

Any values ofµ andµ * satisfyingµ - µ * =

IJz
C(

will

m

do, and the policy can be specified in an open-loop or non-contingent
manner.
To reduce the variance parameter to zero, however, requires a
highly contingent or conditional policy rule.

It is e.g. not sufficient

for the authorities merely to refrain from adding additional "noise" to
the system, by following a non-stochastic open-loop rule with
=

o.

From (24b) this would leave the variance of the shadow exchange
rate process at

1

2

%

2
o > 0 if, as seems certain, there are stochastic
2

shocks to relative money demand growth.

For

and/or o*ct) must be stochastic, <o2 and/or
µ

covariance parameters o

W*Wz

o~ = 0 in (24b).

, o

WWZ

, and o

WW*

to equal zero, D<t>

> 0) with one or more of
chosen to satisfy

Equivalently, instantaneous feedback rules must be

designed which ensure that the forcing variable in the shadow exchange
rate process is constant over time, i.e. that dF(t) = 0 or
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(40) d(D(t) - o*(t)) = _l_ dZ(t)
ex
m

for all t.

This perfect automatic stabilizer instantaneously matches any
(random) excess of home country money demand growth over foreign country
money demand growth with an equal excess of home country domestic credit
expansion over foreign country domestic credit expansion.

There never

is any net movement of reserves between the two monetary authorities.

Fiscal Aspects of DCE Rules Consistent With the Survival of a Gold
Standard
From the two government budget identities (5) and (6), it follows
that, as long as the fixed exchange rate regime survives and i = 1·* ,

d(D - D* l = (~ -

~*

ldt + i(B - B* )dt - d(B - B* >

Under the dee rule given in (40), this means that

Even if the authorities follow the very conservative fiscal policy

* with (differences
of matching (differences in> debt service i<B - Bl

*
stocks of public sector debt
in> primary surpluses(-(~ - ~>>,relative
will still "get out of hand," since in that case
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1
(42} d(B - B* > = --dZ
<:x

m

i.e. relative public debts is a Wiener process (without drift).

The

stabilization of the shadow exchange rate appears to be achieved only at
the expense of the destabilization of the public debts of the two
countries.
We assume that each country has an upper bound on its public debt,

-*
B for the home country and B

18
.
.
f or the foreign
country.

B > B means a

* --!!home country default on its public debt; B > B means insolvency of the
foreign government.
Thus far we have characterized, in (40) and (42), the behaviour of

*
D - D* and B - B.

A benchmark "symmetric" specification of the

behaviour of each of the national authorities which is consistent with
(40> is that eacM country's dee equals the growth in the demand for that
country's money due to real output growth, i.e.

<43a l dD ( t l

=

1
<:x

m

18

-1

( t.

l

t

dy( t l
l
y 0

Such an upper bound exists when there is no Ricardian debt
neutrality, the nominal interest rate exceeds the growth rate of nominal
taxable capacity and there are limits on the magnitude of the future
primary surpluses and the future flow of seigniorage revenues that can
be achieved. A more general model would specify these limits in terms
of e.g. public debt - national income ratios, but nothing crucial is
lost if we interpret our model as one characterized by zero long run
real gro~th and inflation [see also fn 3J.

37

(43b) dD*<t) =

~ <e; 1 ey)O dy*(t)

19

m

Where y(t) and Y* (t) are governed by Brownian motion.
Assume each country follows the fiscal policy rule of equating its
primary surplus and the interest cost of servicing its public debt, i.e.
a strict balanced budget rule;

(44a)

~

+ iB = 0

(44b) ~* + iB* = 0

Given (43a, b) and (44a, bl each country's real output-related
money demand shocks will be reflected in open market purchases or sales
of public debt, i.e.

and

<45b > dB* =

1-- (e; l
m

\

>O

dy*
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A policy of accommodating shocks to money demand due to variations
in real output (thus avoiding any net flow of international reserves and
fixing S> and of balancing the budget (44

a,b> will therefore result in

the national debt following a Wiener process if real output follows a
Wiener process.
If the Wiener process for y (y * l has no drift, then B <Bl
* will
exceed any finite upper limit with probability 1 in finite time, and the
authorities will have to default on their debt.

If y <y * > has negative

drift, it is true~ fortiori that any finite upper bound on B (B * > will
be reached in finite time with probability 1,

If y <y * > has positive

drift µY > 0 <µy* > 0l then the probability that, starting from B <B * >
0
0
the upper bound B <B-* > will be reached in finite time is

exp

t"ii{o -

8
']

[e,{

1
and~ =[~m <t~ ' / ]
0

2

'11•:;:o - ii'>] J where "ii

=

~m

«;1'v'o

µY

<

o

2
o~.

<See J.M. Harrison (1985, p. 431>.

While

this probability is less than 1, the probability that B (Bl
* will reach
an arbitrarily low (even negative> value in finite time is 1 when

µY > 0 <µ

> 0>. This possibility of the government becoming an
Y*
arbitrarily large creditor to the private sector is certainly an unusual
one.

If the government were to run a budget deficit (surplus) equal to
the trend growth in money demand due to real output growth,· (44
would be replaced by

a, b}
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( 44 a ' l Ll + i B

.

.

+ iB

( 44b ' l Ll

Such a financing policy (a balanced budget policy corrected for
non-inflatio nary seignior~ge) takes the drift out of the national debt
processes (45 a, bl which now become Wiener processes without drift.

As

was pointed out already, this "conservativ e" open-loop rule entails
government default in finite time with probability one.

The risk of a

foreign exchange crisis is eliminated, but an eventual government
solvency crisis has become a certainty.
To ensure that the critical gold reserve thresholds will not be
violated and that debt default is ruled out, the primary deficit Ll (Ll* l
will have to be varied in response to exogenous shocks.

The simplest

policy that guarantees survival of the gold standard and government
solvency is one where the primary deficit adjusts continuously to
accommodate all real income-rela ted changes in money demand, i.e.

(44a"l (Ll + iBldt =

and

* + iB .. ldt =

(44b"l (Ll

40

IJnder this set of policy rules 143 a, bl; (44 a", b"l dR
dB

=dB*= O.

~

-dR * = 0 and

International liquidity and public sector solvency are

made certain by adopting a set of highly contingent or conditional dee
and primary deficit rules.
While the rule given here is not the only one consistent with a
viable gold standard and government solvency, any viable rule must be
capable of eliminating the possibility that independent shocks will
cumulate in ways that threaten lower or upper bounds on certain asset
stocks.

Another policy which rules out the possibility of running out

of gold reserves and which does not require the instantaneous matching
of dee and money demand changes, is to let reserves decline freely to
some given level above the minimum threshold level (RMIN + r, r > 0 for
the home country, say} and to engage in a stock-shift open market sale
of government bonds whenever RMIN

+ r is reached.

would restore reserves to RMIN + r', r' > r, say.

The open.market-sale
If both countries

were to pursue such a policy, the process governing the shadow floating
exchange rate would become a Wiener process between reflecting barriers.
To prevent these discrete open market sales from cumulating into
unsustainable public debt growth, the primary deficit will have to
respond to variations in debt service.

This means that all viable rules

are feedback, contingent or conditional rules.

I summarize this as:

Proposition 6.
In order to rule out both the collapse of the gold standard and a
public sector solvency crisis, both monetary policy (dee or stock-shift
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open market operations) and fiscal policy (variations in the primary
deficit> will have to be specified through contingent or conditional
rules.

Conclusion
The idealized two-country gold standard studied in this paper turns
out to lack long-run viability unless monetary and fiscal policy are
used very flexibly to offset the effects of independent exogenous shocks
on international reserves and the public debt.
Absent a flexible dee policy which offsets the effect of money
demand shocks on the stock of reserves, the gold standard collapses in
finite time with probability 1.

This collapse occurs through a

speculative selling attack against one of the two countries' currencies,
which brings that country's stock of gold reserves to its critical
minimal threshold level.

When this happens the monetary authority ends

convertibility of the currency into gold at a fixed parity and a period
of free floating commences.
Even when an eventual collapse is certain, there are once-off
monetary and fiscal policy actions that can raise the expected duration
of the "life" of the gold standard.

An increase in the exogenous stock

of international reserves (through a gold discovery or through the
issuing of "paper gold" (5.D.R."sl by a supranational monetary
authority) raises the expected survival period of the gold standard.
For any given global stock of reserves, there exists an initial
distribution of reserves that maximizes the gold standard's expected
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lifetime.

This distribution can be achieved through (stock-shift) open

market.operations and adjustments in public sector primary non-interest
deficits.

Expected dee (the "drift" of the domestic credit stock

process> can be adjusted by the monetary authorities to alter the
"drift" of international reserves and of the "shadow floating exchange
rate" whose behaviour determines the timing of the collapse and the
currency that will be the subject of a selling attack.
The behaviour of international reserves in the "viable range" where
each country's stock of reserves exceeds its critical threshold value,
can in general be mapped into the behaviour of a shadow floating
exchange rate between two absorbing barriers.

The results summarized

thus far hold for a world in which the exogenous variables (domestic
credit and money demand) follow Wiener processes with or without drift.
When the exogenous variables are governed by Wiener processes, the
shadow exchange rate is also a Wiener process.

Since Wiener processes

are non-stationary, it may be thought that the certainty of collapse in
This is not

finite time is due to that specific feature of the model.
the case.

Fairly simple dee feedback rules relating national dee

differences to the level of the shadow floating exchange rate can
transform the shadow floating exchange rate process into

a

stationary

stochastic process. The proposition that a critical reserve threshold
will be breached in finite time with probability 1 remains valid even

for stationary shadow exchange rate processes.
Finally, I consider flexible dee rules which permit domestic credit
expansion to respond instantaneously to real income-related money demand
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shocks.

While this stops the movement of reserves, it will create

public debt problems.

If e.g. the authorities follow a balanced budget

policy, money demand shocks will, when matched by variations in domestic
credit, be reflected one-for-one in the public debt.

If there is an

upper bound on the level of public debt consistent with government
solvency, this upper bound is likely to be breached eventually.

If the

authorities follow a budgetary policy of running a deficit or surplus
equal to the trend growth of money demand (i.e. equal to the trend
non-inflationary seigniorage that can be raised) a solvency crisis is
certain in finite time.
To prevent both reserve thresholds and public debt ceilings_from
being breached, flexible dee policy and a flexible use of the primary
<non-interest) public sector deficit are required in this model.
Viability of the idealized gold standard analysed here requires the
active and flexible support of monetary and fiscal policy.

Even prima

facie 'sound' unconditional monetary and fiscal rules such as: no
sterilization of balance-of payments deficits or surpluses and a
balanced budget, are inconsistent with the gold standard's long-r11n
survival.

This vulnerability of the gold standard should not come as a

surprise of those who have studied the theory and history of commodity
stabilization schemes which attempt to stabilize the price of some
commodity by purchasing for or selling from a buffer stock.

Formally,

the gold standard is essentially an extreme version of such a commodity
stabilization scheme, as it aims not merely to stabilize but to fix the
price of a commodity.

The same laws of probability that cause the
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eventual collapse of commodity stabilization schemes, most recently in
the-case of tin, jeopardize the long-run viability of a gold standard.
An issue which remains to be investigated is the extent to which
the conclusions of this paper carry over to the case where international
reserves consist (perhaps in part> of the liabilities of one or more of
the national monetary authorities and carry a market-determined rate of
interest.

When reserves can be borrowed with little or no financial

penalty, the distinction between liquidity crises and solvency crises
becomes blurred, and we should only expect to see a run on a nation's
currency as one aspect of a default crisis affecting the whole of that
nation's public debt.
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